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(D. ,

CtliRDr U.

s.

llOOIA)

FCMEI<lli POLICY

Alo08 vith rabbis, min1atere aod priests, a D*llbC' of the Senate

1s atlOQ8 tboae UI)St

8C\I~

aware

of the great l'8D8I Of problems 'Which face

tbe oatioo and Sive riae to ita priDC~ anxiettea.

international oatters, Seoatore are
chart a COUI'M

t.llJ.oouF

a

au ot

c~

Both 1%i &xDeotic and

by their

res.pons1bW.tiee to

41stu.rbin8 public 1saues.

A Seuator'a guide 1n tl'd• pi'OCees 18 a kind or tr1a.ngle.
base 1a the United Statu Cooatitut1on.
the other

hu

diftezoently.

Oae ot tbe staes 1• hie

At the

eonst1tue~1,

c0118Cieace. For -.ch Senator, the three angles are adJusted

Durioa AD¥ 88881on of Consresa,

~,

all Senatore are

confronted v1tb the need to C'J8D dec1e1oaa Wich1 in the end, are enclosed

in this tr18lJ8).e.
A Belator •s duties aleo have a trs,part1te cbal'acter. 'nwy involve

to clomeet1c

oaeo..

and \lh1ch fJ)VerD.SI our relationsbtp vitb tbe nat of the

varl4 by meena of a responsive fc:xntiaD poUey.

'l'bree of the Oenate•s

actions dur1og tbS.a aeeaion of tWI Congreoa are 1ll.ustrat1ve.
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Tbe

Lqlala~ Q)J..!Jf ~1,
ot

vb1ch

the Seoate, points tbe vq to tbe first maJcr U»4atins
Pl"QCeduree in two deca(Sea.

ihe revia2Dn ao4 utena1on

rcentJ¥

pas

ot Conaress1o::aal.
ot the

Appalachian

Act vb1cb tbe SeDate~ a fw 4qs asP 1a a reapoase to the current

aeede of a asult1-atate region left stnn4e4 by tbe abitt1os tSdea of economic
Seaate coaeent to rat1t1cat1oo. ot a Consular Treaty with the

clevelopaeat.

Soviet UniOn is a respooee to the Preelcient •• effort to briag about better
relat1ooe oot

~

vitb tbat nation but v1tb all of Eaatern Burope.

ibtae three -.auree abare a

CQWIC)Q

cbu'act.iatic .

In their

intent, all seek to keep pace Witb cha.ast• It 1a to the factor of change--

to cbanpe 1D the 1nta"Dat10aal a1tuat1on·-tbat I vould firat addreea ,our
attention.

In tbe two decadea a1Dce World War II, we bave oeen a clnstic

NV:la1on 1n the pol1t1cal

e~a1t1on

of coot1oenta. \ e have vttnesaed

the euaergeoce aD4 (p'OW'tt1 of tbe Urd.ted llat1ona aD4 otber 1nte!roat1onal

srou.pinp

ot

ot

natiOQB.

We bave beeD almost overwhelmed b;v a mass outpourt.ns

d.evelopmeo.ta 1n acieoce and technology.

w141 tton of tM nth power

ot

nuc~

Ue bave been present at the

veepooa to the all'a4y complicated

equatJ.one upon which nat world peace aa4 c1v111ze4 survival.

\ie have t -een

coq>ellecl to face tbe trisbt1'Ul SIP& in the mater!al. we.U-beiaa

varl4'a peoplea and to controot the dU...,. wh1eh tbe
population poaea to eftorta to close tbese &'IPS.

~id

ot the

GrOVtb ot
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ne

(C(Q)[p"tf

extent oi cnaa.c!'l! over the past two decades 1s also suggested

contrast of the haunted, var-raV888d Europe ot 1~ aDd the gU.tter1DG,

1n

assertive Europe of 1967.
thr~t

It 1e sensed in the etr1virlg8 for human betterment

Latin America aDd Africa end in otb_. UD4eJ'develDped Z'e810Ds·

Aoia, the fCll'Ce of cbaJlGe 1s 1Jltntoa:ted by the
the techoological adVBDCe of' Japan.

ex~

In

recovery aDi

It ia t"elt in the vast tnuora :lo

Chinese eociety.

It used to be that

vere 80 iuiDeraed 1n cban(r v1th1n our ovn

nation tbat our concern for cbanp be,yo!Xl our borders was m1n1m1.
opeak

were

ot

DOt

tb&t DOt so cUstant time as an 8811 of 1solat10n1sm.

Ac~,

w

oo much 1eolated as ve were insulated in a much lees coq,licated

wrl4 by an exhilarat1D8 oatiooal. uperience aDd by a
Our

sao.

fortuitous~·

enera:les, fortunatel1, coul4 be cUrected larseJ.y to tbe

ment of a nation Which vu as 8j)arsely aettled as it vas

:lDDer

plent~

There was little oeeci for us to look elsewhere for our cb•Jlenaea.

Ex.cept to

'""",Sit a l.1mitea. cur1081ty and to cater to a

develo.PeBiowed.

The

few exotic wanta,

ve were inclloed to avoid an Gteasive ovwseu proJection ot American
power.

We 414 aot eeek our present inVolvement in world affairs. Even
on the we ot Pearl Barbee', aa a nation, ve vere reluctant to accept it.
Yet, as a eequel. to' 01"14 ar II, ve became deaply

in the attaJ.re ot tbe reat ot tbe worl4.

am

irrevocably imeraed

tnuan enESJ aD4 catiooal. pever 1Dto a multitude of act1v1t1es e.broe.d.

cost of a14 progama of' ooe k1.od or cnother, far exat:l)le, baa run to tens of
b1111ons of dollars aver these

~·

tm4 tens of thousands of Arler1C&DS haVe

ePDe a:cro.d at oae time or another to car.ry out those progr'IIUJ.

We bave

eata'blisbecl videspree intelligence llfltwm"ks BDd iutematioaal 1nformat1on
services.
~~

We haVe a militAry stl'\actul'e which costs around 70 bWJ.on each

ua4er 1t, siace the end of Warl4 Warn, millions of Americana bave

been sent abroad.
i'be strategic air force 1s ou a minutes-alert.
and other mieaUee are fused

Intercontinental.

tar almoot instantaneous repr18als. Our

navy

is based in scattered parts of the glObe and 1a on constant patrol of tbe
Seven Seas.

~!can

forces are atatlooed 1n i.w:na:nel"able nations.

In

Europe aa well as in Viet Bam, the level ot tb.1e deploJT!Ient, today, reacbes

to hurJlrede of thowscade.

fousJlt 1a Korea end aow f1abt in Viet Nam end they have 1.ne\1n"ed. tens ot
thouJ3allds of casualties in tbe procesa.

We bave atSrted other gr.-ave con-

tllete el8ewbcre in Aa1a and elaewhel'e in tho vorld. 1n tbe Cuban contronta.
tion, the

ot

ouc~

cloc.t was stopped at one minute to m1dn1gbt by a stTolr.e

Viae aDd restn.iaed 4ipl.cmacy.
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We baw

j~ 0£:!

eecurit7 - - - - -

forty pacts·-that ue are coanitted to military action 1n every part of the
globe except, perhaps, Antarctica.

The viadan of these tar-flwlg ccuu1tments

ha8 been questi.ODed f'ram time to t:tme, and in my

Defense obliaations ere aou so
~tive

8DOI"'DDU8

and so

3uas-nt,

~sed

proper~

so.

tbat vere the

pJ'OVialollB of a number of these CCIIDitments to come into play

s1mul~,

our ab1l1ty to d18Charp then, sbort of nucl.eal' contl..agrat10n,

would be moat doubtful.

In aay .1'w'8D""t1 all outat.D41ng aailitaey eocaitllalta and act1v1t1es
ouB!t to be oubject to continuoue acrutin¥ as to their current vaUdity.
From tiaae to time we close surplu8 m1Utary bues at home.

Ve OUQbt

not

to be reluctant, in aoy aeaae, to Nduce costly cCIIIIitc.nta abroa1 Just as
np1dly as their utUity becomes quaetionabl.e a.a4 tbe1r fore1p policy pur-

poees obsolete.

In tbia conaect10D, I wuld note the larwe u . 5 . m111tary <ieployIIM!Ot 1n Burope.

For a mlllber ot

~·~

six

u. s.

diviaiona have been

statiooed in Western Bumpe UDder BAm. These torcea plua depeodente aM
up to a

quui-~t

mil1t&r1 eatabliehment in Europe of over halt a

ad JHon Americana.
'l'be amual outlay

tor

tbu ca.1131len't. 8110Wlta to b1U1oos of

dol lara. Many haWt rurQid a reduct1oo ot the deployment oo the baaia of

cost or the Fl4 dra1D aa4 balance ot

pa~ts

tbe COGJpetina oeeda ot Viet Baa.

coeta c4 the Bul'opean a..ployment,

~

41tficult1ea or because of

positiOn ot the 4oUar.

'l'be

~

war in 1et

~

to be sure~ 1D an

open pit in terms of its ever-crow1DG reqJ1rene:lts far

Ul.e~ aDd

o,

t!Btertel.
Hovevor, t.he critical 1aaue with respect to the

on European aon 1s

DOt, 1n

eorru>et1ng ceads of Viet Ram.

u. •

deployment

my J\ldeJIBnt, a t1wmc1al one; ncr 1a it tlle
It we requ1re the present level of forces

1n Europe, the DB.tion c811 t1Dd a~

to deal v1th the t1naoc1al aad other

d1ft1eul.Ues t.'h1ch mq be tnvolved .

Die iosue is Wether our aecuritur,

the oecur1ty of the Borth Atlantic rea1Qn aad the secur1't\f

Europe--twenty

~o

Cltter orl4 llar n--eontillue to

ot Western

c~el

the conceotra-

t1on of su American d1vis1oa.D on tbe other side of too Atl.antic .
Hhat 18 inVolved be'1'e 1s tbe accuracy of our current estimates

of one of the critical

c~ts

of our foreign policy. We need to ask

oureel.ves Wether conditions 1n urope bave changed since BAm vas
establ'Sabed.

\le aee4 to ask ourselves whether tbe present level of the

American cQIIIitment is out of ote.P Vitb that charlae.
Let ue l'l)t delude ourael.vesJ V'h1le our mil1tar.Y depl.o1l!lllnt UDder
BA!O bas not chanpd ten- aany yeara, e1rcumstancea in Buro;pe have
SNa~

in recent ,-ears. 1'h.ey bave changed in Russia and Eastern Europe.

They have changed 1n GerrlJ.aey and Western Europe.

to lllTO wu asalJIIId, the

ke.voote

When the troop eoa.oitment

of NlatiODa betwem the Soviet East and

West.em Burope vas one of mutual saa;lcion aDd boatU1ty.

cue

cl:LanSed

l'liOV.

~oclay~

That is oot the

the toae of 1ntza,..Eul'opean relatiOD& baa tbe rtns of a

reaiiOD&bleaeea tbat 'bor4ars on card:1al.ity.

ice

W"eatern Europe,

wac; q>J.Oted 6!3

vould. be re.. lcced vith an

predict

~n

door .

nee, I venture to aaggest,

daeodcz

tho.t the door io aJ.ready o:JCh aor

t 1n 00 years the Iron Curtoin
Whatever the situation C8¥ be two

~,

than

two decades after World

G~tly

ajar1

BD betveeo

ar

n,

Eastern

and estern Europe.

i'hG cllange in the general cl.1mate in Europe 18 reflected in the

attitudes ot the estern Euro,peans tovard NATO.
allies Joined vitb us 1n c vill1ng pledge of

baild1w ot

louder than

• Today, tho actions of tne
W'Ql"do .

manpovet"

J!:t.ll'Opean

aDd nsourcea to tJle

Western~

6peok for

T.u.e actions eusseat that they have long since abandoned

earlier coamon conce,pts at
their share

At one time, the

of~

ana.

!:0 force golils, at leaat. insof'ar nn providing
oateriel

~be

involved.

!l'hG French reaction 1n this retJgeet has beeo. Qbrtqlt end to the

point.

Although t:ltUl adhering to tb.e lortb Atlantic

wit..hd.rawn oJ.l div1Dions d . Other detac

Dts from

'.treaty, France has

TO. Moreover, Prea14eot

4.e Gaalle baa requ.1nd the removal of UA'l'O headquarters

tram

rrenc

territaey.

Great Jlrite.in bas decreased ita cocm1tment of men rmd resources to &\TO 8.04
is

con~lating

of

~e

a :f'Urther cutback ot its ta:my of the 1Ul1ne.

Indeed, all

Buropean W'O CMmbel"e, to one extent or aoot.bor, bave lovered the

priority they attach to their cdli'ta.r)' consiganenta to tbe MTO co

?""·

- 8 -

rorg~

It con

I>M<

n~~1!\w. d1tJ!cul.t1eo that .._ en

European a111ea to veer abarply

~

earlier mU1tary

p~s,;

se Western Eu:rope 1o fer core capable of

tbo
in an

tina these pl

grounded 1n the conviction that the otylc 1n 'Which lA'l'O
tailored 1o oo

lon3el" the

tlOde for Europe .

apart tran O'Z ~estern &-.li'OpeM

allies--bnve telt

OCX!J8 ~ellins

need to

maintain at tul1 strecgtb the pJ.edsed deployment of forces 1n Wectern
Europe .

flhe fears for the oatety of t!mt region 8$linst Soviet eegreos1on

are obv1ou8J..y far

gt"eater

in the Executive Branch of the United States

goverlfttnt t.'lan they ere in the European chancaotes.
'lhio var1ence of view

~hasuco

the catale,pttc nature of our

policy on t1:'0o;.) deployment 1n Europe over th.e past few yearo.

ot late,

there have been 1nd1.cat1ons of a rela.xation 1n thia ri31dity.

Even~

the reductione in the depl.oyoent Wich a:re being dirx:uaoe!l 'rould

~

wholly iDadequate, it is to be boped that there 1s at leaot a better

e.ppreeietion of the reellties at eh.anae 1n Eu'rope.
Ear~ th1a ~~ 1 c1o1ned with

43 other Senators 1D introd.ucins

a resolution W!eh reeot'l'!terYJs to the President that the Exaeut1ve Bnmch

oeke e. aubstant1al reduCtion 1n the u.

In

my Jud{pent,

the actual cize of the

a. Cl111tary deployment itl Europe .

u. s.

establ1Qbment 1n Europe oug1t

to bear sooe relat1onGb.Sp to what othtrr' nA'rO members are prepared to do

With repl"d to the CO!a)n defeaae.

On tbia basiD, I have believed :tor

current realities tball tbe oill wtch are stationed 1n Europe. The lover

fi&D'e

vould be oo less effect1w 1n

of mutual defense of tbe
OUl'

rth Atlantic

Treaw as b:Sr¥11na aad tbat ve bold

oat10Dal. secur1ty as iDsepanble trcaa that

~

Weeten Burope aDd tbe

l'tb Atlantic regioa.

In all catldor1 I bellev. 1.".he:'e have been at.J:'onQ 1'Mldeoe1es to
inertia 1n fore18Zl poUcy,

m1n1Btrat1ons.

~

one cue in point.

Europe.

u.aaer Desaocratic

no lese than Republican a4-

UlTO s1tuattan, as l bave Just d1scu.ued 1t, is lr.1t
A

las 1a a.l1lo nflected 1n policies towazod Eastern

Only 1n recent yeara

have

tlleee polic1e8

begun

to taU cosnszarre

of tbe Cb&DSII 1n that region.

It 1a tor. that PreaiAeot EieeDhollar eou8lt in h1a adll11l18trat1Dn

to reverae aaa. of tbe exceaeee ot eol4 var recr1mioat1on.
restore at 1eut

8QI8

civ111ty to tbe CODI1nct of

• tried

to

u.s.-Sov1et affairs,

f'c:ll'

aq»le, by b:le perfiOOal asaociatkm. vttb Mr. Khru8llchev aD4 oth• lell4ers
of tbe SoViet Union.

It 1a true, too, that

abin:18tl'at1on1 the Ruclear Teat Ban
~8

b84 decreed that

DO

~ty JtiJIC)vec\

aanemanta,

coocluded With the Soviet Union.

It

4ur1D8 President Kelmedy's

repa."dleas of bo\1 ueefUl, should be
baa~

'beeo 1n the last,_.. or

two, bowe11er, tbat u a cation ve have opced our

cbaD3e ill Eutern Europe aDd haw
tses. t • tead

tar

DO

8)'88

to tbe extent of

be!PlQ to aplare vip'oi.UJJ.y 1te poterrtiall11

l.oo8a" to ract vtth ao autouatic "~ Well qpportun1t1ee

UDI'lcratan4Sns and IIB1tual.

ot diac_.oaaent

a r1Sld1t;y Vb.1ch for

Which

advantaae appear. Rat.ber,

tbere 1s

a

b8W

sense

veisba opportunitiea in terms ot our national interest

aDd iiiQ.)Ucat1oos for a mere c1unbl.e peace.

he bet 1a tba1o 8UCh oppartUD1t1• baw beeD --utest tar .,..
tiM u

a I"Mlllt DOt

attl tu4M

oaq ot cben8M 1D llaetem KuftJpe

ot tat ftC10G tonl'da

zo1ftlriee, ,.._bam va..ttu,

w..wm lt'\II'Ope •

but aleo 1n the

AttAr Warl4 War

the

i4eolos1cal p&1'0Ch1ali_., recipl'ocal. feare

Mil tbe SDMr aba«WpUall ot m..D __.81 1D Ol"d.er to aeet the

ot 8UI"YS.val

n,

IIIIi recooetrucUOD vb1cb eaieted. in

~h

sr-t , _ , a

var·abattend regS.oo.

An. tbe U.th ot Stal1D, how¥'er, tben vu a eeo-a1 looaeotng

ot etn1t.18Ck8ta

~t

1n 'YU'1o\ul _,a aa4

:sut.n Bul'opl.

not.b~ 1D

the

part ot tbe C4C • •o1 at .,,. r: 1eote.

ru. ~ vu MD1fested

aroviD8 nepoue

to CODIIUII*' needs on tbe

'lba aatlataction ot theM aee48, 1n turn,

'1'be r1M ot tnae leftla 'MtvMD tbe tiWO ngtona 1D tbe peat
~bee

'bem "ftr1 p!'ODCliUDCecl.

._.l.1rl W&ll DOWithataDltaa-W. .t
aat1ou 1D

OGILUrce

It Mo.alAt be DOte, mnovw, tbat~

leMa all otber

Vitb tbe Soviet Un1oD aDd Butem

~t

a-ope.

There bas

tal8o bee a I"IIPS4 srowth of coa.mtcat1ou1 tl'awtl, cultural achanp alii
otbll' coatacte betviiD a.tern aa4 Weata'D B\.ll"'pe 1n the laat ftN )WII'B •
lfov fer thla I&'QC- bu p:ae ie 1ad1catAcl by a recent f'l8)8lav::
~

tbat

n.. wul.4
~

DO lonpr be ~ of via1tal"e fl'clal tbe VMt!

r.cte of

obaop 1D

ot _. eubeiAMJ tbe .,._,. ot
clazoq OG all eSAee.

&IVliO\Be-

~

8pNk

1Dtn·~

ID llbort1

tor

~.elves .

'fbe talk

cooperat1oo an beard

a~ cleteGte

bae DOt~

I!IDI"e

be4Jm,

-ll-

CCQPV

Our necUoD to obenae Sn lurope illclJ.._ tbe 1D1t1&1

of .PNeidmt

81~

aD4

.rr.~t ~

u well u tbe 1m.n&tSDDal bl'1c1aB 'hlancuaa
~.

~1

O'tbc JutaoD ~ aatS.ou.

a a1plftceut rerl\1Ct10D 1Jl tbe
or

qpoG

*1ch

a

A

~t

..woe~

alJ•.s.ct,

Jma.,. bu

ettaa•t 1D the

to wr nlatioaa v1th tiM 8oY1et Ua1oa M4

u.e,

At 1:M -

the ~ 1a u

11111tuo:Y·teo1uaoloatcal rt.ftll'y

UDV1tt1ns1Y, ooul4 lee4 tbe varlA saw, a

~

to wbtch I baft ~

What 1s 111"10l.ft4 1D tbe la't'Yr caM 1s

d1Nct1oD ot reetcw'1D8

~

111.,.. ot s1pit1aut

vbtch,

t'aa

vi"tD81¥

~ ~.

ep s• vts vith tbe eon.t UD1aa en

ueoctatea v1th this etfcJI't. !l'be;y 4..:1 vttb cul.t\Jnl .-,heap=,

COD8Ul.u' quutlOM,

te11Sst1c .U.U.

1

C'

~

cial aViatloft, aa4 tbe peacefUl _. ot out.!'

ot

llaet

..ch MtioG.

nc.t.l.J, u I

a Coosnlar !'n&Q- Vlth tbe SOvs.t. Un1Go bu -... ratli'Sed ea4

a..,ya..,

by a wte ot

88 to 0 tbe Seaat.

CODIIat.l to tbe

baYW aot..&1

3\IR a tw

rat1t1catloll ot

a treaty oa the pecetul uae ot outaa ..,.ce.
~10118 I'W1

C•
...

a.p

Oil ~ ~·two

ot

u. s.

m1st aauoa., e.pecS&ll;y ill the liabt ot tM
I •

nlatSODa with tbe

~

coatlSct 1u Viet

tnak to 8&1' that I baYe -:1 ow. nticeac• 111 th1a ~UOD.

~ punuit

ot

.,,.,..ta Vith oatiou ot

vith tbe wr tbat is

~ ~

beiDa V11814 ap'a8't ua vith

-

u.sr belp

~

oo tbe otba"

the nJect1cm of the kinds or &greaDIMlts Vhlcb have been

or are proJec

Uitb the Sovlet Union 8lld o1her Eastern European eountrtes w1ll. bOt

slightest difference 1n the mUit;coy situation in Viet
no~~

1

c11mjn1sb our casnal:ttea or hasten the conclusion
In those c1re1.1Dstances1 :1 do not

the

tbat it Vill, in

ot the confl1ct.

tbat it serve our P'.JI'pOOO

to turn our backs on 88l'MII8lt& vbich wu14 otberViae be 1D tbe interests

at

th18 nation.

I do oat see tbat. we adve.nce the germ"al cauoe of peace by

refua1Dg to buU4 more stable relations vhenever and wherever an opportunity

to ao ao 1a pruented.
I f tbe Cllal'JGPR 1n Burope const1mte one Of the critical ccx:pme!lt3

ot

tbe situation Vitb w1ch United States i"areign pollcy must concern 1tsel.f,

a aecaod 1a to be found 1n Aa1a.
th8re l.oc:aa tbe

tbe states ot

l.lllS.POken

~Core&,

AJDns tbe littoral

ot

tbe Western Pacific,

but no leaa pl'OfoUDd confrontation v1th Ch1Da across

Je.pan.,

~aiwan

and Viet llaaa.

In tbat reg1on1 we have yet to resolve tile 4,l..,.a

were posed

by the overtbrov of the national. epverament on the Chinese ft181nland

almost two decades 883•
casting

ot pol1cy Wic~

That

catac~Siie

ot our relations with China. In

trcm ooe ot

sr-t

intimacy to one of

event cOCQpelled the ccawlete rethe space of a few postwar yeoro,

sreat

bOatUity.

T.be Rusa1alls replaced us

in 1he role of friend and mentor 1n the formulations of polie)' which vere
WliSertaJum by the Peking Peo,ple 'e Republic .

Co.ot in ttle role ot .t'oreian devil by the oew g:»vert111ent in Peld.D6;

our policy towards the

oe.tnland

settled back to ''wait s.nd Dee.

~·

e have ;yet to oee

r

bccellle a aoa-policy.

Ot necenity, ve

And tbrougtl the edm1 n:latratiooe of tbroe

clear~

e1tber a way to put toaather tbe p1ecee
or a ~ to

of the pol1cy w1eh coll.apM4 yean •

bea1n

atruh 1n our re-

lat1ona vitb 111e Obiaeae ma'nland .

almost to tbe po1ut

ot

tiOQ•exi&teace .

~

Cb'nue do not ccae to the UD1tAd Statea.

have had s1Qil11"1cant eocount.re vith

ao

not WJ tbtnJ _, nl.,.,

At 1ntanala, U.

Peld.Da

~

s.

djplcllata

oo variOwl

1sa-..

In 19301 tar exut,)le, ve faced ChineM Canmtate at tbe Uo.1te4 llatSowt,

on tbe

t..~Nea

of tt. kol-.n coutUct.

at tbe OeDeva Conf.-eDCes of

3.954

aDd

We aat c1QWQ vUh tbe ChiDeM

aaun

1962, on the 1aaun ot lado-ChiDa.

ODe cbMnel of cont1nuina 41pl.Qaat1c contact with the Peking
epv81'll1D811t baa beenmainta'ned

tor~

yecos.

It baa couiated ot

re&~ll•

raeet1Dga1 f1rat 1D Oeaeva 804 t.bsD 1D Yanav between tbe United States aDd

Cb1oeae Ambu1811ora accrad:1W to PolaDd.

'tbeae convw•t1ooa--br1et

reawarity but DOt, to fit:/ JmovWal, Vitb naul.ta ot 81X¥ n&l
~

abam:::e of travel &D4 41plaMt1c exc:banp betweo Chiaa aDd

tbe United Statu has been QCC1l!'W8°1 eel by
c~

~·

interoatioDal l"81at1Coab1pa,

a IIU'b.lal &beteotioo

DO~

1"''aa Otbel'

tboae of tnae. l'be tact

- 14 -

18 that

(C(QJ[p1f

as a matter of oftic 1.al poUcy# ve

ve vanted

DO pert

of trade with

China. l'bat 1a a polJ.cy Vhich d14 not begin vith the oev bitterness
by Viet

• It 1s more thaD a d.ecade ol4.

vorl4, eo tar u I am avare, which bas

a primary boycott on Chinese

We are the only nation 1n the

sou~t

export& but

ted

for yaars to enfaree

&leo a secondary

boycott

not~

on re-

exported Chineee products.

It the original seeds ot hostility vere covn, as noted, in China •s

sreat zoevolut1oaary upheaval,

thtt)' Ctme

to fruition in 'the Korean ccmtl1ct

1n which thousands ot easu.alties wre intlicted on each aide.

cl.alb vu tollowe4 by a near conflict
and

tsu 1n the

~&ivan

Stra1ta.

OVf1r

Tbat bl.oocSy

the Chinese iel.e.Dds of' Quemo)"

Bov, once

in, 1.n Viet Ham the unresolved

hoat1Uty with China threatens to brina abcr.lt MOther bloody mUitary

~

ment bet1Men ourselves and the Chineee.

In tbe ltglt ot tbta succession of claohea aid near elasheo 1n the
Weatem Pacific it ie not BUrpri81ng that ve are ctUl pu:rau1os a pol.icy of

"walt and see." Moreover, events 1na1de China have

~lied edd1t1onal

blocks to the tamulation ot positive pol1c1es oo China.
not tuatharrl, ot course, but eeeoDd and tb1rd•hand.

We see these ewo:ta

However incOI!IPlete tbia

view mq be, it ta still suftictent to tell us tbat the Chineee have entered
tbe ranka ot those nations with the capabWty ot 1nflict1ng nuclear ctevasta•

ideological str:lte vbich gnaws at the 1Jmer core of Chinese CC'ftllmtaJs.

~

ologantl

wide

tell

ead

UD

t pollt1 nl introspection in Ch1na is

It i.l!{paet 1s bcinS fel.t particularly in the

t this ax:JCnt.

coaatal cities 'Which h1otor1cally have hot.W
in the provinces o.lo!lB the inner border

tbe Russ1an

VffrY deep aDd

strong t estern 1ntluen.cm0Dd

wh1cb have loog felt the pull of

preseD~:th

Ironic~,

tne Soviet Union han now Jo1nod the United Otntes

as auatbaDa 1n the poll.c1es of tile eking tPVernment.

Tho or1g1n of Sioo-

LOViet diti"icultics can be traced bistorically to tbG ilaperial project1oa

\lhich cazT1ed Buasien influence UDI1er the CzarG ooroao tbe Asian m1oland

into AJa.m aai as for ae California aD1 He.wa:U before it be;gm to retract.

Over the centuries there bave been Gino-Soviet claahes 1n the border regiorla

ot MaDChUr1a,MOQgOlia1

am

ot t.b.a :l.atereoto of China

G1Dk1an8·

and

lodeed, whereww there 1s a cozmrseoce

Ruaaia across tb.e ajpall&ea of tbe tribal laD48

of Central Asia) WlC:l.ent entngonia:lS have per1Cid1caJ.l¥ been reactivated.

In

have been a factor second not even
to 14eolog1eal

diff'er~nces

1n coo.tributios to tbe bitterness and

estrar.~ae

ment 1n Chinese..Sov1et relations over the past several :,-ears.
Bovever seriou.IJ tile current dif'.f'1cUlt1es, ve ouellt aot to iodulse

ourselves vitb the expectation that tbey wlll oolve our probl.aa 1n Viet

or Aaia. Recent

de~ents

Borth Viet :lam w¥lcrocor

concerning the supply of' aateriel to

this point.

In spite of the bitter anta3)n1E,

the Soviet Union l\Z3d China have maoaaed to vork out an

~t

Vhich 1n8ure8

-

1(1 -

COPY

the ~tot 3oviert m.a:pplies by vay of China to :North VietNam.

The

prospect would eppear to be, moreover, for a dioinution rath• than an 1atens1·

t1eat1on ot Sino-SoViet antipathies at thia time.

Indeed, in the absence of

basic chaftals in the situation., the level of :lnterdepetderlce beween Russia
and China ie 11kely to continue to rise the longer the Vietnamese confiict

persiats.
ln auy event, we are :restrained by the ''wait 804 oee" e;pprooch

troa. •k1na a4.1ustments of pollcy W1eh W0\1ld take coSJ'li,Zance of cbangeo
1n the Ma.o--Soviet situation.

I lll1l#1t add that

we have

vaited tor years,

but 1t 1a 4oubttul that ve see our vay 81J.Y mre clearly today with respect

to

~h1na

than we d1d a decade

cOII{)OUnllect

ot lts

ana a

halt 83' • China naains a puzzleDerrt.,

tnnenae cCXll{)ledty atd our profound

not l1tel;y that events 1n China v1ll
ea~e

eYel"

~t .

It is

tall, 11ke Chinese checkcn, into

a-le pattern which V1ll. make it easy

tar us

to develop a new policy

v1th reepect to the Chinese mainland and 1te three-quarters of a b1ll1on

people. llha1:ev'c' course ve follov v1ll 1ll'Vt)lve a great measure of un~

That 1a true

non-eOUl"ae.

tar our preMDt course ar, csore accurately,

Have ve dared to aa1t ourselves,

the ten or fiftMG

to the Ch1n.ee

~

tar

~l.e,

in vb.ieh :pol1e;y hu been 1n

mainland might bear

wether or not

~e

in resard

some retQ01'1SibU1ty tor the

'WhiCh ve are preaeutly involved 1n Viet llemt

the

tragady in

Lot me

CCOPY
•e>

critical focus of th!D

+_.a t tre.ged.y, to Viet

tion•s

ing 1sa:rea. Abroad, Viet

lationo. tw tar

the

cc~

fl:ff,

elmoot to

~

to

'l'f!rY

It 1

th-

It cca:u:mdG tho o.ttcn-

sent enxietie •

tion of the Aanini&tratiDn eni the Congr

•

cxclun1on of other

o;pect of our foreigo re-

lations vlth europe, the in'VOlver:l-nt in Viet ll

ot response to

change.

a1~1ticaat

As far relations vtth the

mn va.otly COC'lplicatco tb.e difficul·

Cbineae M1nlaod1 the involv ent 1n Viet

t1ca 7h1ch beve long been prenent.

norrovs

aoreover, t•ith every tlil:t:tory e3calo.t1on
t v1th China.

It is irOnic thn.t a amsl.l. cOWltry Vhos
known 1n

the United States tmmty

of the natiOn'

intemstional afft!lro.

China' bcm1er with one of China'

for

ve

ye:lrD ~

llCJ

bee

1

Viet
n cr1tical cClq!;)Onent

It 1D irOnic that

"natural

:ve no tradition of hostility.

ore cne;aeed en

o " but nJ.co uith e people

It 1 ironic that this phenoocmon

oecurrcd twice in less than two deeades, the other occaaiOn beinG, ot

One indication of the depth of our involvement in Viet Nam is the

creat concentration Of United Sto.tes rdlitary forcet; in the t::outheast Aoian
region.

On t.he ground :11'! South Viet Ha::l tiler

k1ericcn farces.

430,000

In tho ve.ters, oft: ore, t.norc are the 8dd1t1onol 75,000

n \.'ho CoctPOse the

7th leet • Another 3S, 000

in 'l'ha1l.cnd, pcrf'orcing duties vhtch
i.n Viet

are no 1 more than

Ql"C

iea.n sol.diero are atat1ooed

lnr ly connected vi tb the oitue.t10n

• In total, then, well over halt o r.lill1on o1' our 8I"Cll8d forees

are coneigDed to the V1etnameee conf'11ct,
supp11ee 8Df1 equ1pmeat.

~ se

a.t.ons v1tb maaaive GOUnte of

forces an backed by pcMII'tul eleDetlts

of Aoarican mU1tary ot.reaGtb 1n Okinawa, the Philipp1aea aad Quam.

A yaar

Congresa

am

tbe

8IM1

a nalt

l~aldent

I returoed 1'rQQ Viet Jiam azXl.

fi#),

thnt ve were 8Q6B8I9d 1n vbat

opeu-eaded wv \lboae coocluaiou vas DOt ill Gigbt.

mant of

u. s . forces

~

vu

bad oot

~,

a.o.a:L

At that time1 the COI:iD1t-

yet reached 1501 <X>O aoa.

w~,

the balbin& of tb.e uarth

told a conwntion of tbe Asaociated

~ eoo of Ule V8l" in siQbt. '

"I do uot see

Preas:

1n ertect, an

A iew dlqa as:>1 the CCJS'Ial)C'ler of the United Otates

circumacribed.

fOl"Cu :1D V1e't

W"&S,

rewrted to

In the mootha between

t.bMe two CC'IIIIICta, thee baa 1beeu tbe '--nse iDcrease both 1n tile U.
~

cQIIIaiUialt

w

tbe level ot

11111te&7 viOleoce.

•

'l'be var, hovever,

reneios opc-eoUds tbere 18 aot 1n s.i.t;:lt e.o_y lll111'tary vq to a coacluaion
which beara a ratioDal rel&tiooahip to tbe

cc.ai'Qaaot vu Ull4ertaken.

It vW. be

~iginal

recalled

purpoae far vh1ch the

that that purpose vas to

bel» tbe people at £4.ltb Viet s.a preMmJ tba1r tnea.ca
Mil to

-at

thtra ao4 aU the people of

~

tbat the

1t.

vw 1n Viet

~

Pna~t,

Aai.a to \NU4 a better

ew11tnally be brought to an eod, it - . a to me

iaa 1a not

fPill6 to

a\Eh aa tbat wh1cb, flwa tiae to
VS.Ce

Sou~t

u.,

be resolved b,y perBODal criticiam

baa beec &1med

Ml'buaa4or Ool 4hera and otbera.

~

DUf•eacea of

v~iut,

at the Pnei4ent, tbe

Jiar, 118¥ I eq, v1ll 1t be

naol.vecl b)' the at1tl1D& of tbe cowrt:n1ct1ve 4ebate

ot tbe Seaate.

or pol1t1cal cbo1ce

ot 41tfereaces

in or out

reapooaibl.l arriveci at aDd respoasi..

upxaalell, ill ay Jnd..,-t, are eaMilt1al to a aolutioo in Viet Ham.

~aDd

thOl•ttul. 4ebate of pol1cy is not a l.l.muey, it 1a a o.eceesit,y.

lUofut u Pna!4ct .TobDsoo ia comeroaa., be 1a ope to aey
~

....

1lb.1cb ..,. _ . . fl'Oa cU.alcuHioll ard debat. and 11b.1ch 118¥ bolA

~

ot

~·

Be

mow. u

4o

ve

tb&t the

crucial CJUMt10o 1a oot

-

l:,~

-

(C(Q)[p1f

heN thiS WI' began wUt

~

mcuent aDCl 111 an hOD01"8.ble

tllis

\181" C8Q be

L'!'.iaMeZ" .

enaea, at tile

An hor»reble

brcuS1t about by sill;)Uat1c farc1ulas StiCh as

~lieat

possible

eo41E1G is not 9>1DG to be

"set au

tbe V8fl 1nu or "eat

all Ule W8¥ out. " An honorable eadin8 is DOt g>lng to be 'bnlu~t about by
t.be spread of

illtary ViOlence, VitA ita attendant traQildy for all1istoameae,

uarth aD.\ ooutb, for ourselves, aDd ror all ecmce&"Ded.

President Johzsaon'e cooeem With this tra(J86.y is aa deep aa yourD
or m.ae-.-d•per

~s

because be bu to live v1tb it twenty-tour hours a

483· '£h ul.t1mate resporuaibUity is hi8 81'.11, fOI' him, than is oo surcease.
Ill80tar as tbe SeDate 1a concemed, to.'lS"e
Viet

8l"e maoy

v1ewpo1nts on

, but thfJ:re i.e unaotm1ty on the desirabWty of a prompt eudins of

tbis war 1n an hoaOrable peace.

lodeecl, a few veeks 8(J) by a vote of

89

to 2

the Senate euaoreed a cont1maer3 aearch by the President aB1 otaere for a

Def?Pt1ated settlement at tbe collf11ct.
As tor 1Q'aelt, I bave apressed the v1w cany tiriH tbat tbe onJ..y
pract1cable course 1s one wieh aeeks to contain a turtbe:r spread of tbe

CODfUct 1n Aa1&1 one Vhich oeeka to limit our

iDVol"Ye~»Dt

in the contUct

vb.1le tbe ef'tort to achieve an hoDo&"able aett..l.emlnt ie 1nte11BU1ed.

faUurea so far to f1Dd the formula which

~t

lead to l'lefJ)t1at1Dns, in

ao uenae, cUveets us at the obl1@t.tlon to ourselves,
tm1 to the world to cont1uue tbe
~

to ~

Vietnamese peopls

~h .

tbat end, many ougseatSons bave been caae.

or eo, far a.JJPle, I ba.ve

i'be

publie~

OVer tbe paat year

proposed tb.e :f'olloving:

DOI'1iba"D bene

ot a liDe

ot SOUtb Viet._ at

ot W.O.

tbe 17tb

l*'&lJ.el by tbe COD.Structlol1

Wb1ob could be -.!nta'Qid.

taro• u ao altcoatbe to

larae!-Y

by Bautb Vietnaaeee

tbe coot1mwd 'bollb11l8 ot tbe DQI"tb.

2. be l'eOOIIV8l1Dg ot the Gearta Coot.-.oce on the basis of the
19)4 aDI1

aa4 tbe

1962 q1 1 ••nta,

Sov~

by c&U ot tbe co-ohaU'aaD, the Urd.ted K1D8ka

Union, or by flll7 o1'.Hr particSpete;

3· Tbe bol.41Da 1n IMF'"l
•

,_~or

111

aU-A.-iaD contel"eaee tD coaaiAa" tbe CODI11t1ona

VIet

any~

ot u

suitable pl.eceof

booanble peace 1D

._J
4.

The 1Dclu.e1oll 1D a pe~~ee COilteNDCe ou Viet._ of any aDd all

• • • • uwta c.' groupa vt»• coac~ ~ be oeceaeary to 'bi"1D& about an

a. to

1tAe CODflJ.etJ

5· !be
c~

.a oth•
6.

~ins

ot t.M Manna Cootareace ot

'!'be~ ot

cwsa tbe netaration ot

a tace-to-tace -.t1Da ot Secretary ot

c-.,.s.n
ol

n.en

~,

eta~ at

.-pa1aMC1 by the I'NDcb

Prioce llca'oc1.ca SibaDOuk.

u ftMt .at lin.

~t

to cUs-

~· 1n Viet ~~.a.

lD .atitioo, I bavla •JSIIIted tbat cur

can, tbe

to 1nclua&

aoo-pert1cSpat1os D&t1ou 1n Aa1a;

state Dema Rulk M4 1'.ba FareigD Min1s'* ot tbe Pekina

anat

1~

pol!c~s

~t,

._soe v1tb

as uell. aa by the

1 baM Ul"QII4 that tbe propoaala

CJuttht nceiw ccusa.n.Uoo.

I hav.

-*-"eetl var1ou8

the PftaHeat, secretary BUill, aad Mbaa_,. Oolm>era, all

of wich

ve made c,;J.ea.r ....~&41

o.,;

only our

~

IDiGht

i aDi the People 1 B Libero.tiorl Front

but aJ.so tbose

ot

provide a bao18 for eettl.e-

t . I have recamteni1ed tbat tbere be oot Juet a cessation of tbe bombinG
of lior1A'l Viet
both G!dea, to mazwuvers on the Gl"QUDd, 1&l the soa., and. in the air, to the

tbat efforts

~t

be ca4e to initiate talks.

Many otbers in

1'here has been no lack

too Senate aDd elsewhere have offered

ot proposale.

channels of traditional d1plol:3acy.

the United

~

ha;,e been pursued tbroug1 tbe

The diat1D(9118hed Socretary...Qeueral of

tioos, U 'lbant, bas beeo a central f10ll"e 1n these secret

41,plcxnetic e!'farts to brina about peace.
8Dd those ot

mauseotiona·

In opite ot h1e great efforts

other dipl.omats and men ot (pOd v1ll1 peace is

fhie

DO

closer.

te.ctor bas led me to question an epparent reluctaace to brinG

into plq tbe llXln formal oachSnuy of tbe Cbarter o1' the United atiOna ill

an

~tort

to break dow tlle 'bar.riera to

aaa10 toC'1q.

:&:be tact is that tne U.

of ostrich-approach eeems to me to

pa~ee .

I queatioo this reluctance

• , to date, baD cot even taken

CO.\l"t

tor tbe orlJBDSv.&tion 1rrele-.rancy

at boat aa1 eveatual dtsutor at r;,uest.
1 do not belJ.eft ao,yone bu a r1tjlt to

, a Cliracle of peace fra:l tbe U.

Viet

u.

~t,

v1tll respect to

1 c1o believe, boweYw, that the

peoples of the world have a 1"14#at to expect BCDO public 1o4icat10n of conc ern
of mmber natioo8, as 1D the &angrrs of this contl.8grat1on.

rit#lt

to

control.

There 18 a

u;pect, at least, same effort to use the mach1081'1 of the Cbar't.C'
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ot llll ICtift :rola ey tbe U.lf. vitb napec:t to Viet

a..

Two

ot the

prlm!;pal.

pG'tS... eoaca'DIIIl--llcrtb Vset . . 8D4 C"WJDiet Chioa--tcr .....,., are DOt
111 ,,...

ot

tbe UD1te4 lat!oGa.

tSoa f1oal tM

u.w.

It has

l'bat ctoee not fo.reel.oae, bowenlr, a eontnbu-

••..t to •

•t!rel.Y

-.wi'OPl'1atee

z• is

1hat at the ""¥ leeat, tbe U·• . 8boul4 0»a1 its tor\8 to 418cuaa1on of the
1'1'0~

by all1n'I'Olftll

41Ne~

or 1D41nctly in Viet._....... __.. aD4 non-

eubject to ...to. ftwn is no nuoo, ao tar u I can _ , wby tbe Security
CouacU CIIDDDt ottw to l.w'iDs toptbel' not

OG1y the ,_.,_.

.,.t m-u.tely coaca'Dell 1n tbl e1tuatton--that

u,

states wbo are

tbe United Stat. aa4

the eonet Un10D but alBo tbe nDil-maabel'e, that 1e1 Coaant.t China, llortb
Viet._, tbe ps•

snt of South V1.t W. ml 8llY

o~

to • peecetul settl.-.t . J aboul4 think, too, that the
lllfjlt abo

CODSS4er

~1D8

an flliv1aor7 cptnion on the

8\'0'-'P

ot relma.ace

Secur1~

couacu

the Im.nattonal Court ot Juatiee to no4er

aeo..ra Aocorcla ot 1954 aDd 1962. All or

tbe

belliatleota haft IM4e retennee, tree t t . to time, to tbeae Acc<B'da as
tbe bU1a for a
to-~

Let •

pe~Cetul.

eettlaDerlt.

c~,

the illpa't1al aDd .1ud1c1oua ~

llllb clar that. I

~NSP8t

it 1• appropriate to try

ot

tbe

tbe punutt

court

what tbe

ot pece t.brou8l

the

u .• . secunty CouocU DOt 111 l1eu. ot private or eecnt dipla.cy, not 1n
U.U. or a N\'i'Yal ot the

a-eva Coaterence.

Rather, l INI8I8t it aa a
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~lellaet

GOme
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or precipitant of tbeae

pl'Otlise

~o

or 80¥ other 1ibich

~bold

ot a oolutioo.

As I bave DOted, the etf'ort has beea
fin:i a pathway to peace

mea.

e1Dce the outeet to

tbrol.lSl secret and tnd1t1ooel. 41»lamacy

aD1 it

bao beetl uoauccesstul. Therefore, I tllil* there 1a everytbiaa to be p1neft
and. DOth1ng to be lost at tbia tiM by a publ1c Mal'Ch before the

u.

1. tor

tbe sa.P• between t..be pooitionG of the 1bell.1aeroots aDd tbe .us by which tbey
ma.y be br1cie;e4.

!!bere io no o.ssurance that a reoort to tbe procedural 1118Ch1Dery

ot tile UD1ted llat1ooa v11l produce

~ IICI'e

yielacl by secret and traditional Mplallocy.

unloas aD1 until the

~proach

•ipiticut re8Ul.ts tban tbDH

'lbat v1ll. DOt be kDovn1 boWer•,

18 triei.

Inaofar as this atioo ia coocamed, I caDOOt aee tbat ve v:lolate

ot peace at the
veey

Be.sed on the KoreeD prec.a.ate, our

U. U.

pr~ly ur~ l4lQil

e:ms ~t

cen

the Securi'Q' CouacU a vote on the8e tvo apecitic

reoolutiona perta1n.1Da to Viet llaal:
One, that the Oecretary General be 1Datructe4 to 1Dv1te
SONl'DMGta and

~a

cUrectl)' aDd 1Dd1nctq 1nWlve4 in the 'fietDallllue

cootlict, :1DclncUaa ChiD& .a. ID."tb Viat lla, to participate betare tbe
COUDC11 1D an ope and

nn)SmSted

c11acuaa10n ot tbe coatliCtJ

TuG, t.'lat tbe Cec1A"1~ Couac:U request tbe Intel"Dat1DDal

Court ot Justice to

ot

naa. an

the O..V. AcCOI'48

COQflict.

e4v1101")' opin1on

ot 1954 11111. l9Ga 8llll

oa the cUJ"NDt -wliraM U:ty

tbe obl'•tioDe 'Wb1C!l tbe• ..,.._
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CCO~V

cloa~ r&;~

In

of our aatioa's

I

~aei&e

foreiF atfa:l.rs

tatea. Whetber ve

~

pleaaes ua1 w1ll DOt

111

that the re:JAIOQSibUity for the cooduct

vet~ted

in tho Prea16ent of the United

vitb hSm ar Clisasree1 wbetber he pleues or dia-

11abten cme iota the onerous burdens vhich rest on h1s

ahonld.-. u a reWJ.t of tbe Vie'b:Jaclue cooflict.
for

ad'fice to his aides in the Executive Branch.

~

to the people of th.ia rw.tion.

~ Ol"

not tbere 18 coruJeQt

The Pna14ent

~look

lle mq lee* to tbe Oeoate

Whether or not adVice is torthcom1ng,

to h1a course, tbe Prea14ent atill guat

decide Vbat he belleves to be in the best interests of the United States.

Tbat 111 his ru.POQ81bU1ty.

He cannot anare it---he can

~

auume 1t1 on

bebalt of all of us .
~

aa4

pnfa"81

President

Deed~

aDd should have 0111' uaderstaDdina, our help

and tbe auppart 'Whlch can be S1V'fll1 to him in (J)OCl consc1eoce.

It o\&Slt to be boroe 11llll1Dd at all t:llles tbat vbatever contribution this

natiOn can ate to a peaceful settlement in Viet Mal:l, that contribution can
~

be ua1e and vUl be made on behel f of e.ll of ua, 1n the eDd, l.:y the

Pres14ent of the UDitec1 States.

